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The paper deals with the political economy of inequality in the distribution of 
consumption expenditure in the Arab region. It argues that  the relevant concept of 
development for dealing with political economy issues is that of development as freedom. 
Within such concept the paper looks at the nature of the Arab social contracts that prevailed 
in the region since independence and up to the mid-1980s. It argues that the core nature of 
these contracts was re-distributional and that their cumulative achievement was the current 
moderate degree of inequality enjoyed by the Arab region compared to the world. However, 
there is preliminary evidence of a rising degree of inequality in the Arab region, most likely 
due to the economic reform policies pursued by a number of countries in the region. This 
trend raises a number of concerns from a political economy perspective including the 
implication of the tolerance towards increasing inequality during the early stages of 
development, and development disasters; inequality traps  in terms of the interplay of socio-
political and economic inequalities; and equality of opportunity. Policies required for dealing 
with such implications are reviewed and found to be equivalent to the type of policies that 
were pursued by the Arab countries prior to their succumbing to neo-liberal policy packages 
of the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
ﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﺔﻤﺋﻼﳌﺍ ﺔﻳﻮﻤﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﰲ ﺓﺍﻭﺎﺴﳌﺍ ﻡﺪﻌﻟ ﻲﺳ  
 ﺺﺨﻠﻣ  
                  ﻝﻭﺎـﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺍﺬـﻫ ﺽﺍﺮـﻏﻷﻭ ﺔـﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﰲ ﻲﻛﻼﻬﺘﺳﻻﺍ ﻕﺎﻔ￿ﻹﺍ ﻊﻳﺯﻮﺗ ﰲ ﺓﺍﻭﺎﺴﳌﺍ ﻡﺪﻌﻟ ﻲﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﺔﻴﻀﻗ ﺔﻗﺭﻮﻟﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ ﻝﻭﺎﻨﺘﺗ
                 ﺮـﺸﺒﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﺎـﻴﺧ ﻊﻴـﺳﻮﺘﻟ ﺔـﻴﻠﻤﻋ ﺎﻬﻔـﺻﻮﺑ ﺔـﻴﻤﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﻡﻮـﻬﻔﻣ ﻲـﹼﻨﺒﺗ ﺔﻗﺭﻮﻟﺍ ﺡﱰﻘﺗ  . ﰲﻭ                    ﱵـﻟﺍ ﺔـﻴﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻﺍ ﺩﻮـﻘﻌﻟﺍ ﻥﺃ ﺔـﻗﺭﻮﻟﺍ ﺢـﺿﻮﺗ ﻡﻮـﻬﻔﳌﺍ ﺍﺬـﻫ ﺭﺎـﻃﺇ 
                   ﻝﻭﺪـﻟﺍ ﻊـﺘﲤ ﻪـﻴﻠﻋ ﺐـﺗﺮﺗ ﻱﺬـﻟﺍ ﺮـﻣﻷﺍ ﺎﻬـﺘﻌﻴﺒﻃ ﰲ ﺔﻴﻌﻳﺯﻮﺗ ﺖ￿ﺎﻛ ﺪﻗ ﻲﺿﺎﳌﺍ ﻥﺮﻘﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻨﻴ￿ﺎﲦ ﻒﺼﺘﻨﻣ ﻰﺘﺣﻭ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪﻟﺍ ﻝﻼﻘﺘﺳﺍ ﺬﻨﻣ ﺕﺩﺎﺳ
       ﱂﺎﻌﻟﺎﺑ ًﺔ￿ﺭﺎﻘﻣ ﺓﺍﻭﺎﺴﳌﺍ ﻡﺪﻋ ﻦﻣ ﺔﻄﺳﻮﺘﻣ ﺔﺟﺭﺪﺑ ﺔﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ  .     ﺢﺿﻮﺗ ﻚﻟﺫ ﻦﻣ ﻢﻏﺮﻟﺍ ﻰﻠﻋﻭ                 ﺔـﺟﺭﺩ ﻉﻭﺰـ￿ ﱃﺇ ﲑـﺸُﺗ ﺔـﻴﻟﻭﺃ ﺪﻫﺍﻮـﺷ ﻚﻟﺎﻨﻫ ﻥﺃ ﺔﻗﺭﻮﻟﺍ 
              ﻝﻭﺪـﻟﺍ ﻩﺬـﻫ ﺎﻬـﺘﻘﹼﺒﻃ ﱵـﻟﺍ ﻱﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﺡﻼﺻﻹﺍ ﺞﻣﺍﺮﺑ ﻦﻣ ﺐﺒﺴﺑ ﺎﲟﺭ ،ﺔﻴﺿﺎﳌﺍ ﺔﻠﻴﻠﻘﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﻮﻨﺴﻟﺍ ﰲ ﻉﺎﻔﺗﺭﻻﺍ ﱃﺇ ﺓﺍﻭﺎﺴﳌﺍ ﻡﺪﻋ  .     ﺔـﻗﺭﻮﻟﺍ ﺶﻗﺎـﻨُﺗﻭ
            ﻟ ﻲـﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﺩﺎـﺼﺘﻗﻻﺎﺑ ﻖـﻠﻌﺘﻳ ﺎـﻤﻴﻓ ﺓﺍﻭﺎـﺴﳌﺍ ﻡﺪـﻋ ﺔـﺟﺭﺩ ﺩﺎﻳﺩﺯﺍ ﰲ ﻩﺎﲡﻻﺍ ﺍﺬﻫ ﲔﻣﺎﻀﻣ           ﺔـﻟﺎﺣ ﰲ ﻢﻗﺎـﻔﺘﻟﺍ ﺍﺬـﻫ ﻞـﺜﳌ ﻲـﻌﻤﺘ﷟﷤ﶠﺍ ﻞـﻤﺤﺘﻟﺍ ﻦـﻣ ﻞـﻜ
             ﺔﻳﺩﺎـﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﺓﺍﻭﺎـﺴﳌﺍ ﻡﺪـﻋ ﻞـﻋﺎﻔﺗ ﻰـﻠﻋ ﺐـﺗﱰﳌﺍ ﺓﺍﻭﺎـﺴﳌﺍ ﻡﺪـﻋ ﺦـﻓ ﰲ ﻉﻮﻗﻮﻟﺍ ﺔﻟﺎﺣ ﻖﻤﻌﺗﻭ ،ﺔﻳﻮﻤﻨﺗ ﺙﺭﺍﻮﻛ ﻦﻣ ﻪﻴﻠﻋ ﺐﺗﱰﻳ ﻥﺃ ﻦﻜﳝ ﺎﻣﻭ ﻊﻳﺯﻮﺘﻟﺍ
         ﻊﻤﺘ﷟﷤ﶠﺍ ﰲ ﺹﺮﻔﻟﺍ ﺓﺍﻭﺎﺴﻣ ﻦﻣ ﻞﻋﺎﻔﺘﻟﺍ ﺍﺬﻫ ﻞﺜﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺐﺗﱰﻳ ﺎﻣﻭ ،ﺔﻴﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻﺍﻭ  . ﻭ      ﻞـﻣﺎﻌﺘﻟﺎﺑ ﺔـﻠﻴﻔﻜﻟﺍ ﺕﺎـﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﺔﻗﺭﻮﻟﺍ ﺖﺿﺮﻌﺘﺳﺍ
                                 ﻞـﻴﺒُﻗ ﺔﻘﺑﺎـﺴﻟﺍ ﺔـﻴﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻﺍ ﺎـﻫﺩﻮﻘﻋ ﺭﺎـﻃﺇ ﰲ ﺔـﻴﺑﺮﻌﻟﺍ ﻝﻭﺪـﻟﺍ ﺎﻬـﺘﻌﺒﺗﺍ ﱵـﻟﺍ ﺕﺎـﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻊـﻣ ﺔـﻘﺑﺎﻄﺘﻣ ﻥﻮﻜﺗ ﺩﺎﻜﺗ ﺎﳖﺃ ﺕﺪﺟﻭﻭ ﲔﻣﺎﻀﳌﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ ﻊﻣ
ﻱﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﺡﻼﺻﻹﺍ ﺕﺎﺳﺎﻴﺳ ﻖﻴﺒﻄﺗ ﺀﺍﺮﻏﺇ ﺖﲢ ﺎﻬﻋﻮﻗﻭ .  
 
 
* This paper was presented to third plenary session of the 15
th Annual Conference of the ERF in Cairo 
(23-25 November 2008. I am grateful to Ahmed Gelal, the Executive Director of ERF for inviting me 
to write the paper; and to  Khalid Affan, and Riadh Ben Jalili, for comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper. Remaining errors are mine. 
  11. Introduction 
 
At the outset it may be useful to remind ourselves that  political "economy is 
about the sources of political power and its uses for economic ends. The sources of 
political power are coercion and legitimacy in varying combinations. Power can 
reasonably be seen as an end in itself.. However, power is not just an end in itself: it 
can be used to increase and to redistribute incomes" (Collier 2008: i-110). The policy 
instruments available to further these objectives (of economic growth and income 
redistribution) are the usual public expenditure (financed by taxation) and the 
regulation of economic activity (i.e. institutions). "Political economy investigates how 
interests and institutions shape these choices" (Collier (2008: i-111).  
 
Basing themselves on the definition of political economy provided by Adam 
Smith in the Wealth of Nations Ajakaiye, Drazen and Karugia (2008: i4) argue that 
the "primary purpose of political economy is to enhance economic development 
prospects of the people". This, we suggest, is the relevant understanding of political 
economy in the context of developing countries
(1). Combining the two definitions it 
can be argued that in the context of developing countries the political economy of 
inequality should be dealing with development policy choices
(2).       
 
As is well known development policies pursued by most developing countries 
up to the end of 1970s were largely based on the propositions of the old school of 
development economics. The major strategic themes of such propositions have 
included industrialization, rapid capital accumulation, mobilization of surplus rural 
labor, and planning and an economically active state (see, for example, Sen (1983)). 
Since the resurgence of neo-classical economics in the early 1980s, especially with 
respect to development policy making, such earlier development policies came to be 
labeled as "poor policies". "A country with poor policies would be one with high 
inflation, large fiscal imbalances, and a closed trade regime" (World Bank (1998: 
12)). The pursuit of good policies is said to be good for economic growth, and that 
there was a real trade-off between policies for economic growth and those for 
reducing inequality
(3). Such perceived trade-off, in our opinion, informs the debate on 
the "political economy" of inequality in developing countries, including countries of 
the Arab region.          
 
Based on the above understanding this paper deals with the political economy 
of inequality in the distribution of consumption expenditure in the Arab region, it 
being recalled that consumption expenditure is the best available proxy for the 
standard of living in developing countries (in contrast to income being the relevant 
proxy in the advanced countries). In section (II) we briefly discuss the relevant 
concept of development that will be adopted. In section (III) we discuss the nature of 
the Arab social contracts that prevailed in the region since independence and up to the 
mid-1980s. We show that, compared to the world, the Arab region enjoys a medium 
degree of inequality. This, we suggest, should be understood as the cumulative 
achievement of the redistributive social contracts. We also show that the recent trend, 
however, is one of increased inequality. In section (IV) we discuss these recent trends 
in the context of tolerance towards inequality during the early stages of development.  
 
Societies that tolerate increasing inequality are said to be endowed with a deep 
"tunnel effect" ala Hirschman (1973). In the absence of the "tunnel effect" developing 
  2countries could fall into "development disasters" like civil wars. We show that a 
relatively large number of  Arab countries experienced "development disasters" over 
the period since independence. In section (V) we discuss "inequality traps", the 
interplay of socio-political and economic inequalities. Inequality traps are essentially 
based on the concept of equality of opportunity. Policies required for dealing with 
such traps during the process of development are reviewed and are found to be 
equivalent to the type of policies that were pursued by the Arab countries prior to 
their succumbing to neo-liberal policy packages of the 1980s and 1990s. Section (V) 
summarizes the most important results of the paper.   
 
2. A Development Framework 
 
We suggest that the discussion of the political economy of inequality in 
developing countries requires the adoption of a broad definition for the "development 
process". Such a definition,  which gained world-wide acceptance, is that 
“development can be seen as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people 
enjoy” (Sen (1999:3)). Without getting involved in the philosophical foundations of 
this approach we need to note that it requires judging the welfare of individuals 
neither in terms of the utility of goods and services, nor in terms of primary goods, but 
in terms of substantive capabilities to choose a life one has reason to value. “A 
person’s capability to achieve functionings that he or she has reason to value provides 
a general approach to the evaluation of social arrangements, and this yields a 
particular way of viewing the assessment of equality and inequality” (Sen (1992: 4-5); 
emphasis is not in the original).   
 
“Development as freedom” is a much broader approach to understanding what 
is meant by development compared to other approaches that identify development 
with increases in per capita income, or with industrialization, or with technological 
advance, or with social modernization. Being broad the capability perspective is 
closely related to the concept of “equality of opportunities”; but they are not identical. 
“In a very real sense, a person’s capability to achieve does indeed stand for the 
opportunity to pursue his or her own objectives. But the concept of ‘equality of 
opportunities’ is standardly used  in the policy literature in more  restrictive ways, 
defined in terms of the equal availability of some particular means, or with reference 
to equal applicability of some specific barriers or constraints. Thus characterized, 
‘equality of opportunities’ does not amount to anything like equality of overall 
freedoms” (Sen (1992: 7); emphasis is in the original)
(4).  
 
Development as a process of expanding the freedoms that people enjoy, has 
found international recognition in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
adopted by the United Nations in September 2000. Over the past eight years, since 
their formulation, the MDGs and the broader definition of development on which they 
are based, influenced the development policy debate around the world (see, for 
example, the Commission for Africa (2005); Sachs (2005); UN Millennium Project 
(2005); the World Bank (2006); and, the Commission on Growth and Development 
(2008))
(5). The IMF, the World Bank, and the UNDP are all involved in helping least 
developed countries in estimating the feasibility of achieving the goals and the cost of 
doing so!!
(6)   
 
  3Prior to the formulation of the MDGs, UNDP pioneered the measurement of 
“development as freedom” in terms of the by now famous Human Development Index 
(HDI). Capabilities included in the HDI are: the ability to live longer (as reflected in 
life expectancy at birth); the ability to read and write and to have access to available 
information (as reflected in literacy rates and combined educational enrolment rates); 
and, the ability to have a decent standard of living (as reflected by real per capita 




Under the MDGs the overarching objective of development in developing 
countries is the reduction of poverty. The first MDG requires the eradication of 
extreme poverty and hunger, where poverty is expressed as the proportion of people 
living below one dollar a day (i.e. the head-count ratio). Four of the remaining MDGs 
look at poverty from a capability, and achievements, perspective (education, gender 
equality, health and the environment).   
 
Under the dominant money-metric approach to poverty reduction over a 25-
year horizon both economic growth (changes in real par capita consumption 
expenditure) and changes in the inequality in the distribution of consumption 
expenditure matter. Thus, changes in poverty over time have a growth component and 
a distribution component: if a country experiences both economic growth and a 
decline in inequality it can be assured of reduced poverty. Otherwise, it will all 
depend on the relative strength of each of the two components
(8). In this respect we 
hasten to note that among the various measures developed in a growing literature on 
pro-poor growth the one proposed by Son (2004: 308) stipulates that  "growth is 
unambiguously pro-poor if the entire Lorenz curve shifts upward"
(9).      
 
Despite the above, most of the existing literature on the political economy of 
inequality approached the issue in the context of the narrow definition of 
"development" as "growth" by looking at the role of inequality in the growth process. 
A wide-ranging debate has ensued in this respect. From a purely theoretical economic 
point of view the nature of the debate is summarized by Aghion and Howitt (1998: 
280) by noting that until “recently, a common wisdom among economists was that 
inequality should, if at all, have a stimulating effect on accumulation and growth; the 
same line of thought would in turn emphasize a fundamental tradeoff between 
productive efficiency (and/or growth) and social justice”. This common wisdom, 
however, is now being revisited.  
 
A number of theoretical models have been proposed that show a negative 
relationship between inequality and growth (or, equivalently, a positive correlation 
between equality and growth)
(10). Relevant to our purpose are models specifically 
dealing with political economy considerations. Some of these models emphasize the 
effect of income inequality on social unrest. Under these models two links are 
identified: the first is from inequality to social unrest, while the second is from social 
instability to growth, it being understood that social unrest discourages investment. 
The second class of models emphasizes the role of politics in the fiscal process where 
the level of government expenditure and taxation is the result of a voting process in 
which income is the main determinant of a voter’s preferences. The logic is that in a 
society with high inequality the majority of voters will vote for high taxation thus 
  4discouraging investment and growth. Hence, a more equal society will see relatively 
moderate taxation that does not discourage investment and growth.     
 
The most important hypothesis based on this work is that initial inequality is 
harmful to long-run economic growth. The bulk of the empirical work undertaken to 
test the hypothesis is based on running a standard growth regression by adding an 
inequality measure to the right hand side of the growth regression equation
(11). 
Despite the recent origin of this literature a variety of results are reported, the most 
recent of which establishes a negative causal link between initial asset inequality 
(where the Gini coefficient of operational land holdings is used as the measure of 
inequality in the distribution of assets) and the growth performance of countries
(12). 
 
3. Arab Social Contracts and Inequality 
 
It is well known that the Arab region is composed of a highly diverse group of 
countries. According to ERF classification four groups could be identified according 
to production structure: diversified economies (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Syria, and Tunisia); mixed oil economies (Algeria, Iraq, and Libya); oil economies 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates); and, 
primary export economies (Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, and 
Yemen). For 2005, excluding Iraq, Comoros and Somalia, the diversified economies 
accounted for 51% of the total population and 23% of total GDP; the mixed oil 
economies accounted for about 14% of population and GDP; the oil economies 
accounted for 12% of population and 59% of GDP; and, the primary export 
economies accounted for 22% of population and only 5% of GDP.  
 
In the context of the above diversity in economic structure a relevant starting 
point to deal with the political economy issues of inequality in the Arab region is the 
nature of the social contracts that ruled the relationship between the state and society 
since independence
(13). Despite the diversity just noted Arab social contracts shared a 
number of core features summarized by  the World Bank (2004-a: 2) to include the 
following:  
 
(i)  “a preference for distribution and equity in economic and social policy”;  
(ii)  “a preference for states over markets in managing national economies”;  
(iii)   “the adoption of import-substitution industrialization and the protection of 
local markets from global competition”;  
(iv)  “a reliance on state planning in determining economic priorities";  
(v)  “an encompassing vision of the role of the state in the provision of welfare 
and social services”; and,  
(vi)  “a vision of the political arena as an expression of the organic unity of the 
nation, rather than as a site of political contest or the aggregation of 
conflicting preferences”.        
 
It is admitted, rather grudgingly, that the Arab social contracts, despite various 
problems and setbacks, delivered “unprecedented levels of economic growth and 
  5social development. Between 1965 and 1985 MENA’s economic growth rates were 
among the highest in the world, averaging 3.7 percent per capita a year. The social 
contract also meant low levels of poverty and income inequality. The social payoffs 
from these policies have been enormous, with dramatic reductions in mortality and 
increases in life expectancy, school enrollment rates, and literacy levels” (World Bank 
(2004-a: 2); emphasis is not in the original)
(14).  
 
The World Bank (2004-a: 2-3) goes on to observe a trade-off between the 
developmental achievements of these contracts and political freedoms. It is noted that 
large segments of the population benefited from the redistributive mechanisms of the 
social contract to the extent that they were identified by governments as a core 
constituency. “From 1960 through the 1980s, these social groups emerged as 
prominent winners in the political economies created by the interventionist-
redistributive social contract. The welfare gains also helped to cement an 
“authoritarian bargain”, with citizens trading restrictions on political participation in 
exchange for economic security and the public provision of social services, welfare, 
and other benefits” (World Bank (2004-a: 3))
(15).      
 
In a rather rare admission the World Bank (2004: 3) notes that the inability to 
continue with the redistributive policies in the Arab countries was primarily caused by 
outside events: “declining oil prices, shrinking demand for migrant labor, and reduced 
remittance flows”!!! In response to the then emerging economic crisis governments in 
the Arab countries, like most governments in less developed countries, opted for the 
adoption of adjustment policies largely on the advice of the World Bank and the IMF: 
“across the region governments cut subsidies, reduced public expenditure, and 
reformed exchange rate regimes… (Adopted economic reforms) also included: 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, fiscal reform and trade liberalization, 
deregulation, and strengthening the institutional foundations for a market-led 
economy”.  
 
The above World Bank's assessment of the cumulative development 
achievements in the Arab countries is confirmed by looking at the 2005 human 
development index
(16). The UNDP (2007) report shows that seven Arab countries, 
comprising the six oil economies of the Gulf in addition to Libya, achieved high 
human development status an HDI of 0.8 or more. These seven countries account for 
about 15% of the Arab population; each of the remaining Arab countries achieved a 
medium human development status (i.e. an HDI of 0.5 but less than 0.8). Thus, in 
2005 none of the Arab countries were included in the low human development 
category. Compared to human development achievement around the world, where 
about 8% of world population lived in low human development countries, this is 
indeed a credible performance. It should be noted, however, that the average Arab 
achievement is lower than that for the world: a simple average HDI for high human 
development category of 0.847 for the Arab region compared to 0.897 for the world; 
and, for the medium human development category of 0.649 for the Arab region 
compared to 0.698 for the world.             
 
Having noted the above, we now look at the evidence regarding the inequality 
in the distribution of consumption expenditure in the Arab countries utilizing 
available information on the Gini coefficient, the most widely used measure of 
inequality
(17). The most recent compilation of the state of inequality, as measured by 
  6the Gini coefficient, is provided in Ferreira and Ravallion (2008)
(18). The information 
is provided for 130 countries
(19). For each country the Gini coefficient is reported for 
two survey years: one in the 1990s, or just before that decade, and the other in the 
2000s. However, not all countries have two entries. Out of the total number of 
countries in the compilation 98 had household surveys conducted in the 1990s and 
prior to 2000, while 84 had household surveys conducted in the year 2000 or more 
recent years. Further we note that for some countries the Gini coefficients are based 
on income distribution while for other they are based on consumption expenditure. In 
what follows we appropriately adjust the information available.    
 
To appreciate the state of inequality in the Arab region we first establish a 
benchmark at the level of the world. To look at the inequality in the distribution of 
consumption expenditure at the level of the world we converted the reported Gini 
coefficients based on the distribution of income by subtracting 6.6 percentage points 
to obtain the Gini coefficients corresponding to the distribution of consumption 
expenditure (for the advice to undertake such an adjustment see Deininger and Squire 
(1996), and Li, Squire, and Zou (1998)).    
 
In the 1990s the lowest recorded degree of inequality in the world is that of  
the Slovak Republic (a Gini coefficient of 0.129 in 1992) while the highest degree of 
inequality is recorded for Lesotho (a Gini coefficient of 0.631 in 1995). The overall 
average degree of inequality in the world is 40.6 percent, with a standard deviation of 
10.6 percentage points. In the 2000s the lowest degree of inequality is recorded for 
Sweden (a Gini coefficient of 18.4 percent for 2000)
(20); while the highest degree of 
inequality, a Gini coefficient of 53.6 percent, is recorded for Bolivia (for 2002). The 
overall average degree of inequality in the world is 37.57 percent, with a standard 
deviation of 8.91 percentage points. Thus, over the decade (roughly speaking) 
inequality in the world declined and its dispersion also declined.  
 
To focus on the current state of inequality in the Arab region use will be made 
of the results for the 2000s. Using the above two descriptive statistics, together with 
the population for 2005, we can derive the distribution of the degree of inequality in 
the world as comprising low inequality (for countries with a Gini coefficient of less 
than 0.3311 (i.e. mean inequality minus half a standard deviation); medium inequality 
countries with a Gini coefficient of 0.3311 but less than 0.4202 (i.e. with a range 
equal to one standard deviation); and high inequality countries with a Gini coefficient 
of 0.4202 or above. Over these inequality ranges the 2005 population of the sample of 
countries was such that about 11% of the population was living in low inequality 
countries; about 40% were living in medium inequality countries while 49% were 
living in high inequality countries.  
 
With the above inequality benchmark we can now look at the current state of 
inequality in the Arab countries. We have five Arab countries for which the Gini 
coefficient information is available for the year 2000, or more recent years. The 
reported Gini coefficients are 0.352 for Egypt (for 2004/05)
(21); 0.389 for Jordan (for 
2002)
(22); 0.393 for Mauritania (for 2004); 0.3921 for Syria (for 2004)
(23); and, 0.3396 
for Yemen (for 2005). Each one of these countries enjoys a moderate degree of 
inequality compared to the world. The simple average Gini coefficient for this sample 
of Arab countries is 0.3682 confirming that the Arab countries seem to enjoy a 
medium degree of inequality. Such a result should be understood as the cumulative 
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independence.   
 
Despite this moderate level of inequality in the 2000s there is evidence to 
suggest that the trend of inequality has been one of increase in the Arab region since 
the 1990s. To explore the trend in inequality in the Arab region we pooled the 
available information from eight Arab countries to look at the distribution of 
consumption expenditure as if the Arab world is one region. From the quintile 
observations for each country we generated a distribution for the region as a whole  
centered on two years 1995 and 2004
(24). To do this we invoked the assumption that 
the distribution in question did not change over the relevant period for those countries 
that do not have the information for the two chosen years. Country real per capita 
consumption in 2005 PPP dollars for the chosen years are used together with the 
corresponding population. Thus for each country we have five income groups, and for 
each year we have 40 income groups. Based on these pooled income groups for each 
year the parameters of a quadratic Lorenz curve are obtained
(25), based on which we 
calculated the shares of the various quintiles in consumption expenditure. The 
relevant information on the basis of which the calculations are based is presented in 
annex table (A.1). From the pooled data the average real consumption expenditure is 
calculated as US$1897 in 1995 and US$2008 in 2004 implying an annual rate of 
growth of 0.63 percent.   
 
Our results confirm the above noted trend in inequality in the Arab region: the 
Gini coefficient for 1995 is calculated as 36.23 percent (i.e. 0.3623) compared to a 
Gini coefficient of 38.76 (i.e. 0.3876) for 2004. This implies that the Gini coefficient 
of consumption expenditure in the Arab countries recorded an annual rate of increase 
of one percent, a rate considered quantitatively significant by Li, Squire and Zou 
(1998)
(26). We hasten to note that, given the per capita consumption growth rate, this 
increase in the Gini coefficient implies a Kuznets' elasticity (i.e. a percentage change 
in the Gini coefficient as a result of a percentage change in per capita consumption 
expenditure) of about 1.59. This, we suggest, is a very high elasticity compared to 
values obtained from cross-country regressions.          
 
The above recent trend in inequality in the Arab region can be understood in 
terms of the inequality convergence result of Ravallion (2003). According to the 
result inequality convergence at the level of the world is explained in terms of the 
policy and institutional convergence since the 1990: “low- inequality socialist 
economies have become more market-oriented, which has increased inequality. On 
the other hand, non-socialist economies have adopted market friendly reforms. In 
some of these economies pre-reform controls benefited the rich, keeping inequality 
high, while in others the controls had the opposite effect, keeping inequality low. 
Thus liberalizing economic policy reforms can entail sizable redistribution between 
the poor and the rich, but in opposite directions in the two groups of countries” 
(Ferreira and Ravallion (2008: 14)). Pending further confirmation, it can be suggested 
that the pursuit of economic reform policies in Arab countries since the mid-1980s 





  84. Inequality and Development Disasters 
 
Related to the political instability hypothesis noted earlier is the concept of the 
"tunnel effect" due to Hirschman (1973)
(27). The tunnel effect deals with the political 
economy issue of the trade-off between economic growth and equity in the 
distribution of income in a developing economy at an early stage of development. The 
original statement of the tunnel effect is that in "the early stages of rapid economic 
development, when inequalities in the distribution of income among different classes, 
sectors, and regions are apt to increase sharply, it can happen that society's tolerance 
for such disparities will be substantial. To the extent that such tolerance comes into 
being, it accommodates, as it were, the increasing inequalities in an almost 
providential fashion. But this tolerance is like a credit that falls due at a certain date. It 
is extended in the expectation that eventually the disparities will narrow again. If this 
does not occur, there is bound to be trouble and, perhaps, disaster" (Hirschman (1973: 
545))
(28).     
 
The "tunnel effect" takes its name from an analogy with a driver on a left lane, 
of a road with two lanes moving in the same direction, stuck in a traffic jam where no 
car is moving. "After a while the cars in the right lane begin to move. The spirit of the 
driver lifts considerably (i.e. he feels better off) on the understanding that the jam has 
been broken and with the expectation that the turn of the left lane to move will come 
any moment. If the expectation is disappointed, and only the right lane keeps moving, 
the divers on the left lane may at some point "become furious and ready to correct 
manifest injustice by taking direct action (such as crossing the double line separating 
the two lanes)" (Hirschman (1973: 545)).     
 
The tunnel analogy was translated into the standard language of welfare 
economics, where the welfare of a representative individual of a given, disadvantaged, 
group is defined on own income, own expected future income and the income of a 
representative individual of another, advantaged, group. Expectations about future 
income are formed by averaging current incomes of the two types of individual. In the 
appendix to the original paper, authored by Michael Rothschild, a dynamic version of 
the model assumes a log linear indirect utility function. Where superscripts D and A 
denote the disadvantaged, and the advantaged, groups respectively, and where y is  
current income, and e expected income, we have for the welfare of a representative   
individual of the disadvantaged group (where we suppress the time dependence of the 






D) = α log y
D + β log y
A + γ log e
D.  
 
Expectations are formed according to the following: 
 
(2) log e
D = (1 – η) log y
D + η log y
A.  
 





A) = [α + γ (1 – η)] log y
D + [β + γη] log y
A.    
 
Clearly the tunnel effect is present whenever [β + γη] is positive.  The 
dynamics are introduced by assuming initial equal income and differential growth for 
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The idea that initially the disadvantaged individual hopes to share in the good fortune 
of the advantaged, but grows more discouraged as time goes on, is captured by a 
specification of the weighting parameter η in the expectation formation mechanism 
such that the parameter declines over time at a constant rate. With these assumptions 
it is shown that the change over time in welfare of the D group can be solved for a 
date beyond which such welfare will begin to decline and society's tolerance for 
inequality will reverse (Hirschman (1973: 566)). 
    
Hirschman (1973: 554) concluded that the tunnel effect is to be found in 
homogenous societies. In such societies “where resources are largely owned 
domestically, the tolerance for economic inequalities may be quite large as no 
language, ethnic, or other barrier keeps those who are left behind from empathizing 
with those who are making it”. In addition, traditional family arrangements facilitate 
the operation of the tunnel effect, provided that the traditional society is not highly 
segmented. The tunnel effect is expected to be weak, or non-existent, in fractionalized 
societies. The absence of the tunnel effect is expected to lead to “development 
disasters”. Two kind of development disasters are distinguished. “The first is 
characteristic of societies that have attempted to develop by means of a strategy 
implying the arising of new inequalities or the widening of old ones….The other kind 
of development disaster occurs in countries in which the above strategy is nicely 
abetted for a while by the tunnel effect, but the ruling groups and policy makers fail to 
realize that the safety valve, which the effect implies, will cease to operate after 
sometime”. Examples of the first kind of development disaster are given as Nigeria 
(Biafra war) and Pakistan (the breakaway of Bangladesh).     
 
Hirschman’s development disasters have since then came under rigorous study 
by the literature on civil wars. In the context of this specialized literature a civil war is 
defined as an internal conflict, involving a government, with at least one thousand 
battle-related deaths per year and at least five percent of the deaths inflicted by the 
weaker party
(29). The economic causes, and consequences, of civil wars have recently 
been subjected to a rigorous empirical analysis. What has come to be known as the 
Collier-Hoeffler model of civil war is summarized in Collier, Hoeffler and Sambanis 
(2005). In the analysis individuals are assumed to behave rationally and choose 
whether to support a rebel movement (i.e. to fight the government) on the motivation 
of greed and grievance. Pure greed rebellions will take place only when they are 
financially viable. Similarly, even rebellions motivated by grievance need to meet 
financial constraints. For a civil war to occur rebel groups need to build fairly large 
organizations that require substantial resources for wage payments and for the 
purchase of arms. The grievance discourse, where inequality plays a dominant 
motivation, is the one favored by political scientists.  
 
The economic theory of civil wars focuses on the feasibility of rebellion as 
well as its motivation. The feasibility hypothesis proposes that when a rebellion is 
feasible it will occur. “The agenda of the rebel group is determined by the preferences 
of the social entrepreneur leading whichever organization is the first to occupy the 
(rebellion) niche. Sometimes this will be a not-for-profit organization with a political 
or religious agenda, and sometimes a for-profit organization. Where the niche is 
sufficiently large several rebel groups may coexist, but the factors that explain rebel 
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(2006: 5)).  
 
The latest empirical results on the basis of the above construct are reported in 
Collier Hoeffler and Rohner (2007)
(30). A logit regression analysis is used based on a 
sample of 172 countries with 71 civil wars over the period 1965-2004, resulting in 
1063 observations where the risk of war start is examined in five year periods. War 
start is coded as one if a war breaks out during the five-year period. The statistically 
significant determinants of civil war are found to include: (a) the level of per capita 
income, the lagged growth rate of GDP per capita income,  the composition of income 
represented by a quadratic of primary commodity exports as a ratio of GDP (the three 
are the economic factors); (b) the number of years since the end of the last civil war, 
and colonial history, a dummy that takes the value of one if the country was a former 
French African colony and zero otherwise (these two are the historical factors); (c)   
social fractionalization (defined by the product of the famous ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization index and a religious fractionalization index), and the proportion of 
young men in the age range of 15-29 years (these two are the social factors); and, (d) 
a geography variable defined as the proportion of the terrain of a country that is 
mountainous.  
 
What is relevant for our purposes is the statistical significance of the social 
fractionalization variable, which confirms the result that the absence of the tunnel 
effect gives rise to a “development disaster” defined as the start of a civil war. What 
has been conspicuously absent from this literature, however, is the statistical 
significance of any inequality variable as a cause of civil wars. One possible 
explanation for this is the unavailability of reliable data on inequality in the 
distribution of income or wealth, and additionally the type of inequality that needs to 
be explored, and included, in the analysis.  
 
In a wide ranging critique of the statistical studies of civil wars Cramer (2005: 
16-18) calls for “looking deeper into processes, mechanisms, and relations that 
generate and sustain inequality”. He argues that such a research route can be found in, 
among others, Hirschman’s “tunnel effect” and Stewart’s (1999 and 2007) “horizontal 
inequality”. In this respect it is noted that these two approaches are closely linked.  
Stewart is of the opinion "that most studies of the relationship between economic 
inequality and political conflict have understood it only in terms of ‘vertical 
inequality’, that is, the distribution of income across the whole population of 
individuals from the richest to the poorest and as captured by the Gini coefficient. 
However, she argues, horizontal inequality is far more significant, reflecting as it does 
differential standards of living and access to public sector employment, political 
rights, educational opportunities, and so on among collective groups within a society. 
These groups may fall into various classification kinds, for example, religious, 
regional, class, or ethnic” (Cramer (2005: 16)).   
 
Similarly Sambanis (2005: 327-328), himself an active and original 
contributor to the statistical studies of civil wars, drawing conclusions from case 
studies to refine and expand the empirical study of civil wars, notes that “inequality is 
another variable that keeps coming up in the case studies, but is dismissed as 
nonsignificant in most quantitative analysis of civil war”. He argues that perhaps the 
relevant inequality variable is that dealing with horizontal inequality: “Thus , if 
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consider should be regional inequality, measured in terms of the differences between 
mean levels of per capita income across subnational units (such as provinces)”.  
 
Within the context of the civil war literature we may define an indicator for 
the existence of tunnel effect as the time that has elapsed since independence before 
the outbreak of a civil war of more than one year duration. A recent compilation of 
development disasters, understood as the outbreak of civil wars, listed 53 countries 
that have recorded such civil wars in developing countries (Sambanis (2008); see 
annex table (A.3))
(31). The average duration of the tunnel effect in the sub-sample of 
non-Arab countries is about 16.26 years, with a standard deviation of 15.25 years. The 
duration ranged from a minimum of zero years (i.e. no tunnel effect; recorded for 
Angola, DR Congo, India, Kenya, South Korea, Myanmar, and Namibia) to a 
maximum of 46 years (i.e. a society endowed with a deep tunnel effect, recorded for 
Haiti).   
 
Eleven Arab countries are Algeria (which gained independence in 1962, and 
outbreak of a civil war in 1992 meaning a duration of a tunnel effect of 30 years); 
Djibouti (1977 with a civil war in  1991 and a tunnel effect of 14 years); Egypt (1945 
with a civil war in 1995 and a tunnel effect of 50 years); Iraq (1945 with a civil war in 
1961,  and a tunnel effect of 16 years); Jordan (1945 with a civil war in 1970, and a 
tunnel effect of 24 years); Lebanon (1946 with a civil war in 1975 and a tunnel effect 
of 29 years); Morocco (1956 with a civil war in 1975, and a tunnel effect of 19 years); 
Somalia (1960 with a civil war in 1988, and a tunnel effect of 28 years); Sudan (1956 
with a civil war in 1962 and a tunnel effect of 7 years); Syria (1946 with a civil war in  
1979 and a tunnel effect of 33 years); and the Arab Republic of Yemen (1945 with  a 
civil war in  1962 and a tunnel effect of 17 years)
(32). The average duration of the 
tunnel effect in Arab countries is 24.27 years with a standard deviation of 11.66 years. 
The duration ranged from a minimum of seven years (i.e. very shallow tunnel effect; 
recorded for Sudan) to a maximum of 50 years (i.e. a society endowed with a deep 
tunnel effect, recorded for Egypt).  
 
Conducting the usual t-test of difference between two means it can be 
ascertained that, contrary to expectations, the difference between the two groups of 
countries is marginally statistically significant: a t-value of 1.6364 (with probability 
0.1079)
(33). This a rather surprising result. Using Alsenia et al (2003) fractionalization 
indexes we computed a composite social fractionalization index as the product of 
ethnic, language and religious fractionalization. For the Arab sub-sample of civil war 
countries the average social fractionalization index is 0.0411 while that for the non-
Arab sample is 0.1712. The t-value for the difference between means is 2.1 
(significant at the 5 percent level) indicating that Arab countries are more 
homogenous than other developing countries that suffered "development disasters)
(34). 
As such, therefore, from a cultural point of view, one would have expected the Arab 
countries as a group to have been endowed with a relatively deeper tunnel effect 
compared to other developing countries
(35).      
 
In view of the above, we suggest that there is a need for further investigation 
of the existence of the tunnel effect in the Arab countries primarily to alert policy 
makers of the dangers of taking the implication of the current degree of inequality for 
granted. Such investigation of the existence of the tunnel effect in Arab countries 
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the broader definition of development, in the form of differences between mean levels 
of development achievements as summarized by the human development index 
(HDI).              
 
5. Inequality Traps and the Rediscovery  
    of Relevant Development Policies: 
 
  It will be recalled that during the latest stages of the preparation of the World 
Development Report 2000/201: Attacking Poverty  there ensued a major disagreement 
between the team preparing the report and a number of quarters (including mainly the 
US treasury, at the time under the leadership of Larry Summers, and a number of hard 
line neoclassical economists from inside and outside the Bank). The nature of the 
disagreement was explained by Kanbur (2001), the original team leader of the WDR 
who subsequently resigned, and Wade (2001).  
 
  According to Wade (2001:1436) the January 2000 draft of the WDR gave rise to 
strong opposition inside and outside the Bank: “Many critics said it short-changed 
growth, and gave far too much attention to income inequality. It even said that world 
income inequality was widening, and that this widening was bad – not good- for 
growth. This, said the critics, was a politically biased finding, the result of poor 
econometrics. Many mainstream economists claim that, in any case, income 
inequality is good for growth, because it strengthens incentives to effort and risk-
taking”. So the fundamental disagreement at the time revolved around the relative 
roles of economic growth and income inequality in the reduction of poverty in 
developing countries.  
 
  Be the above as it may, it seems that indeed time is the best healer for 
disagreements on the political economy of inequality. The WDR 2006: Equity and 
Development elaborated the role of inequality in the development process. To 
eventually formulate its ultimate message the WDR 2006 defined equity in terms of 
two principles: the principle of "equal opportunity" and the principle of "the 
avoidance of absolute deprivation" (World Bank (2006: 18-19)). Consistent with 
Sen's capability approach it is explicitly noted that by "equity we mean that 
individuals should have equal opportunities to pursue a life of their choosing and be 
spared from extreme deprivations in outcomes" (World Bank (2006: 2)).  
 
  The main message of the report is stated as that "equity is complementary, in 
some fundamental respects, to the pursuit of long-term prosperity" (World Bank 
(2006: 2)). Such complementarity arises from two sets of reasons. One set has to do 
with market failures in developing countries (i.e. missing or imperfect markets), and 
the resulting mal allocation of investment opportunities and resources. If correcting 
market failures "is not feasible, or far more costly, some form of redistribution can 
increase economic efficiency" (World Bank (2006: 2)). The second set of reasons has 
to do with "the fact that high levels of economic and political inequality tend to lead 
to economic institutions and social arrangements that systematically favor the 
interests of those with more influence. Such biased institutions can generate economic 
costs and society as a whole is then likely to be more inefficient and to miss out on 
opportunities for innovation and investment" (World Bank (2006: 2).  
 
  13  It is on the basis of the two principles of equity, and their implications for 
resource allocation, that the concept of the "inequality traps" is formulated. The crux 
of the inequality traps is the realization that political systems do not always 
appropriately aggregate peoples’ views into social preferences. “Policies and 
institutions do not arise from a benign social planner who aims to maximize the 
present value of social welfare. They are the outcomes of political economy processes 
in which different groups seek to protect their own interests. Some groups have more 
power than others, and their views prevail” (World Bank (2006: 20)). Thus inequality 
traps result from the interaction of political, economic and cultural inequalities: 
“unequal economic opportunities lead to unequal outcomes and reinforce unequal 
political power. Unequal power shapes institutions and policies that tend to foster the 
persistence of the initial conditions” (World Bank (2006: 20))
(36).      
  
  The existence of inequality traps has two main implications. “The first 
implication is that, because of market failures and of the ways institutions evolve, 
inequality traps can affect not only the distribution but also the aggregate dynamics of 
growth and development. This in turn means that, in the long run, equity and 
efficiency may be complements, not substitutes” (World Bank (2006: 21). The second 
implication is that “no real-life policy or institution is entirely exogenous: no existing 
organization or application of a policy idea has been implemented on a purely 
technocratic basis. All policies and institutions exist because the political system has 
brought them into being or allowed them to survive. The political system reflects the 
distribution of power and voice attained at a particular time and place. This 
distribution is, in turn, influenced by the distribution of wealth, income, and other 
assets and outcomes in that society” (World Bank (2006: 22-23).     
 
  The above equity dimension gave rise to an enlightened discussion of relevant 
development policy reorientation, albeit in the context of a stable macroeconomic 
environment (appropriately defined) and fairly efficient institutions (World Bank 
(2006: 9-16; and, 129-205))
(37). Such reorientation requires the involvement of   
government in investment in human capacities (including early childhood 
development, education, health, social protection); in building equitable justice 
systems; in ensuring greater equity in access to land (including land reforms); in 
ensuring equitable access to infrastructure (including roads, electricity, water, 
sanitation and telecommunication); and, in ensuring that market transactions are not 
influenced by the wealth or status of participants (including financial, labor, and 
product markets). Required resources to implement such interventions can be 
mobilized from a moderately progressive tax system that does not have large 
efficiency losses (e.g. a tax system with simple exemptions for basic foodstuffs and an 
expanded role for property taxation) (see, World Bank (2006: 13)).       
 
  The above equity reorientation of policy is tantamount to rediscovering relevant 
development policy pursued by Arab countries during the decades of 1960-1980. We 
hasten to note that in the 1980s such policies were dubbed “bad policies” by the 
World Bank itself (in addition to the IMF).  It is now very well known that the social 
contracts that prevailed in the Arab countries over the period 1965-1985 addressed the 
various equity concerns of the development process through the mechanisms of social 
transfers and public employment in addition to investment in infrastructure. There is 
empirical evidence to suggest that indeed these are very effective mechanisms for 
such a role. The empirical evidence for this was first established by Milanovic (1994) 
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(38).  
 
  Bulir (2001) uses the original data of Milanovic which is assembled for an 
international sample of 75 countries including four Arab countries (Algeria (1989), 
Egypt (1975), Jordan (1986), and Morocco (1980)). The original specification of the 
inequality-development relationship due to Kuznets (1955) is estimated, where a 
measure of inequality in the distribution of the standard of living (e.g. the Gini 
coefficient) is regressed on the stage of development as reflected in real per capita 
GDP (the specification is usually a quadratic in GDP per capita). The inequality-
development relationship is augmented by adding two explanatory variables relating 
to the role of the state: (a) state employment: defined as the percentage of all 
employed who work in the state sector inclusive of government administration; and 
(b) social transfers: defined as the percentage share of cash and in-kind social 
transfers in GDP, where social transfers are taken as pensions, maternity and family 
allowances, temporary sick pay, unemployment compensations, education and health.  
 
In the regression analysis the Gini coefficient, in percentage terms, is used as 
the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are the logarithm of GDP per capita 
expressed in 1988 PPP international dollars, and its square; in addition to state 
employment and the social transfers. All explanatory variables are taken for the same 
year of the observation of the Gini coefficient. The estimated relationship confirmed 
the existence of a Kuznets inverted-U relationship (significant at the 5-percent level), 
had an adjusted R-squared of 0.67, and with the social policy variables significant at 
the one percent level. According to these results an increase in subsidies and transfers 
as a ratio of GDP by a percentage point reduces the Gini coefficient by 0.42 points. 
Similarly, an increase in state employment as a ratio of total employment by a 
percentage point reduces inequality by 0.23 points.  
 
Another augmentation of the inequality-development relationship is 
undertaken by Calderon and Serven (2004). This time around indicators of 
infrastructural investment are added to the explanatory variables on the right-hand 
side of the Gini coefficient equation (where the Gini coefficient is entered as a ratio 
between zero and one)
(39). Two aggregate indicators of infrastructure are built: the 
first captures the stock while the second captures the quality. The stock indicator is a 
composite indicator of the number of main telephone lines per thousand workers (with 
a weight of 0.6159); the electricity generating capacity in Giga Watt per thousand 
workers (with a weight of 0.6075); and the total road length normalized by the surface 
area of the country (in km per squared km; with a weight of 0.5015)
(40). The 
composite stock indicator is the weighted average of the logarithms of the component 
indicators. For each country the original data is averaged over five years over the 
period 1960-2000.  
 
The index of the quality of infrastructural services is also based on deriving 
weights from principal component analysis focusing on three indicators: the services 
of telecommunications (measured as number of years waiting for telephone main 
lines; with a weight of 0.5923); power services (measured as the percentage of 
transmission and distribution losses in the production of electricity; with a weight of 
0.5814); and transport services (measured as the share of paved roads in total roads; 
with a weight of 0.5578).       
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regarding the effect of investment in infrastructure on inequality: "a one standard 
deviation increase in the index of infrastructure stocks (1.2) reduces the Gini 
coefficient by 0.06. An analogous increase in the index of infrastructure quality (1.13) 
reduces the Gini coefficient by 0.01. Hence, a one standard deviation increase in both 
quantity and quality of infrastructure services would reduce the Gini coefficient by 
0.07" (Calderon and Serven (2004: 23))
(41).  
 
Despite the appropriateness of the distributive content of the Arab social 
contracts there is evidence to suggest that Arab countries, under pressure from various 
quarters, succumbed to the temptation of drastically changing their commitment to 
reducing inequality in the distribution of the standard of living. Thus, like many other 
less developed countries, most Arab countries adopted stabilization and structural 
adjustment programs like secular Gods since the mid-1980s. The end result was that 
during the 1990s the Arab region (looked at as an income group) was the only region 
in which subsidies and social transfers as a ratio of total government expenditure 
declined from 21% in 1990 to 18% in 1997, before recovering to 23.8% in 2005
(42). 
The evidence also shows that the region did not have an excessive ratio compared to 
other income groups. With the exception of Kuwait and Morocco, all other Arab 
countries experienced a decline in ratio of subsidies and current transfers to total 
expenditure. Compared to other country groupings the Arab countries did not have a 
significantly higher average ratio in 1990 and they recorded the lowest average ratio 
in 1997 and 2005.  
 
The Arab countries also seem to have abandoned their commitment to equity 
in terms of employment in the state sector. Evidence on this, however, is lacking. 
Indirect evidence is to be found in the relatively high unemployment rates that 
distinguish the region compared to other world regions. Moreover, there is evidence 
to suggest that the unemployment rate in a number of Arab countries had a 
statistically significant upward trend since the 1970s. In this respect it is to be noted 
that the World Bank (2004-a: 99, figure 4.6), though deals with unlocking the 
employment potential in the Arab countries, failed to provide the detailed evidence on 
how public employment changed over the 1990s decade
(43)!  
 
As is usual with information requiring surveys the details of unemployment in 
the Arab countries are problematic, both in terms of availability and quality. Despite 
this, however, there is evidence to suggest that during the period since 1980 to the 
present unemployment rates remained relatively high and exhibited increasing trends 
in most of the Arab countries for which time series data is available. These countries 
are Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Syria
(44).  
 
Available time series evidence shows that the average unemployment rate for 
1980s decade ranged from a high of 16.5% in Algeria to a low of 4.8% in Syria. 
Morocco's unemployment rate was second highest (14.2%), followed by that of 
Tunisia (13.6%), that of Egypt (7.6%), and that of Jordan (6.2%). The weighted 
average unemployment rate for this group of Arab countries for the 1980s is 10.6%, 
where the labor force weights for 2005 are used. For the 1990s decade the average 
unemployment rate for Algeria remained the highest at 25.3%, followed by that for 
Morocco (18%), with both Jordan and Tunisia recording the third highest average 
unemployment rate of 15.5%, followed by Egypt (9.6%) and Syria (8.1%). The 
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two decades the unemployment rate did indeed increase for all countries under 
consideration. Similarly, though slightly fragmentary, preliminary evidence for the 
2000s decade indicate that the weighted average unemployment rate increased to 
15.5% from its average in the 1990s decade
(45). These overall trends are confirmed for 
all the countries above except for Morocco 
(46).   
 
Given the relatively high unemployment rate, and its tendency to increase over 
time in most Arab countries, and taking into account the pressures of the global 
market on policy makers, there is now a move in policy circles for designing 
macroeconomic policies that can initiate and sustain a high level of employment 
without sacrificing increased productivity. According to Bhaduri (2005:14) domestic 
"demand-led expansion is the cornerstone of this employment strategy…An 
employment guarantee scheme at the minimum wage, financed to the extent necessary 
by an expansionary budgetary policy of the government, might be required to break 
the inertia of continuing serious unemployment". The implication of such a strategy 
run counter to the neo-liberal advocacy of reforming labor market policies and 
institutions with the aim of increasing the flexibility of labor markets. In this respect 
the Commission on Growth and Development (2008: 45) notes that "rules and 
institutions exist to safeguard the rights of labor, defending workers against 
exploitation, abuse, underage employment, and unsafe working conditions. In some 
countries, these rights are protected by unions or government regulations. But in 
others, no such protections are in place. The Commission feels strongly that these 
rights should not be sacrificed to achieve other economic objectives, including 




The most important conclusions of this paper can be summarized as follows:  
 
(i)  the political economy of inequality in the Arab countries should best be 
addressed under a broad understanding of development as a process of 
expanding the freedoms that people enjoy to choose the style of lives that 
they have reason to value;  
 
(ii)  such an understanding lies behind the MDGs of the UN, which can be 
interpreted as requiring the adoption of reducing poverty as the 
overarching objective of development;  
 
(iii)  once we are concerned about poverty it follows that we must be concerned 
about the inequality in the distribution of consumption expenditure (i.e.  
the relevant indicator of the standard of living in developing countries);  
 
(iv)  it goes without saying that we would also be concerned with initiating, and 
sustaining, economic growth; and indeed taking into account inequality 
traps, it can be argued that there exists no trade-off between equity and 
efficiency considerations for long-run growth processes;  
 
(v)  the Arab region, despite the diversity of its countries, in the initial stages 
of its development immediately after independence adopted social 
  17contracts that were redistributive in nature. These social contracts achieved 
both growth and equity resulting in credible poverty reductions over about 
twenty years before they were derailed by the adoption of structural 
adjustment policies starting in the mid-1980s. Despite the development 
achievements a relatively large number of Arab countries contracted 
"development disasters" in the form of civil wars;  
 
(vi)  one of the enduring legacies of the Arab social contracts is a moderate 
degree of inequality judged by world standards. Recent trends, however, 
show that inequality in the region is on the rise;  
 
(vii)  thus far, however, such increasing inequality did not give rise to 
development disasters, but it may. A surprising result is that the Arab 
countries do not seem to be different from other developing countries in 
terms of the existence of the tunnel effect, which calls for a careful 
investigation of the existence of tunnel effect in the region;  
 
(viii)  invoking the concepts of equality of opportunity and inequality traps, there 
is evidence to suggest that the world community is rediscovering relevant 
development policy, inclusive of relevant redistributive policies. Some of 
these policies were the core policies which defined the Arab social 
contracts up to the mid-1980s.    
 
To sum up  each Arab country will do well by defining its own ranges of 
"good policies", taking into account the changes that have taken place in the world 
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(1) Drazen (2006: i18-i71) argues that political economy models used to study political economy issues 
in developed countries can be relevant to developing countries. Motiram and Nugent (2007) develop a 
model relevant to developing countries in this tradition using the provision of education as a 
mechanism through which inequality and development interact.  However, Azam (1995) argued the 
opposite position, especially as regards the relevance of the median voter theorem.  
(2) We take it for granted that the third wave of globalization since the early 1980s has severely 
constrained the autonomy of an individual country to pursue national development policy; see, among 
others, Bhaduri (2005).  
(3) It will be recalled that this was the major policy advocacy position of the International Financial 
Institutions, and the donor countries, under the by now largely discredited, and abandoned, structural 
adjustment programs. 
(4) In presenting empirical evidence in the context of this broader approach to development Sen (1999: 
38-40) identified five instrumental freedoms that have immediate policy relevance: political freedoms; 
economic facilities; social opportunities; transparency guarantees; and, protective security. Sen (1999: 
38) notes that these “instrumental freedoms tend to the general capability of a person to live more 
freely, but they also serve to complement one another”. A careful reading of the content of the above 
instrumental freedoms clearly shows the political economy nature of issues of the inequality in the 
distribution of income, wealth, and indeed opportunities.  
(5) Reflecting this world wide consensus the Commission on Growth and Development (2008: 1) 
specifically notes that growth "is not an end in itself. But it makes it possible to achieve other important 
objectives of individuals and societies". The Commission goes on to refer to the MDGs. We hasten to 
note that such was the critique leveled by Sen (1983) against the conventional "development 
economics" of the 1940s and 1950s.   
(6) Indeed the adoption of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) by the Boards of the IMF and 
the World Bank as required documents to access concessional funding, and eventually getting debt 
relief, by less developed countries is an implicit acceptance of this broad definition of development. It 
can easily be argued that PRSPs are in the nature of medium-term development plans with a different 
tag attached to them; but, of course, that is a long "political" economy story.  
(7) Countries are classified in three mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories according to the value 
of their HDI: as high human development (for an index equal to or greater that 0.8); medium human 
development (for an index equal to 0.5 but less than 0.8); and low human development (for an index 
less than 0.5). In addition to the HDI, in its 1997 Report, UNDP also proposed the Human Poverty 
Index (HPI) to capture various aspects of "unfreedoms" or deprivation from the above capabilities. 
(8) As is well known the most widely used measure of poverty under the money metric approach, the 
head-count ratio, could be formulated as follows, where H( ) is the poverty measure, μ is mean real per 
capita consumption expenditure, z is the per capita poverty line, θ an index of inequality, and λ= μ/z is 
a standard of living ratio: H = H(λ, θ). Percentage change in poverty, G(H) can be written as : G(H) = η 
G(λ) + υ G(θ); η is the partial elasticity of the poverty measure with respect to mean consumption 
expenditure (which is negative), and υ is the partial elasticity of the poverty measure with respect to the 
inequality index (which is positive). The first term in the G(H) equation is the growth component while 
the second term is the distribution component.   
(9) As is well known the Lorenz curve is a relationship between the cumulative share of income and the 
cumulative share of population. Thus if L(P) is the cumulative share of income of the corresponding 
cumulative share of population P, a valid Lorenz curve is required to satisfy the following restrictions: 
L(0) = 0; L(1) = 1; L'(0) ≥ 0; L''(P) ≥ 0 for all P belonging to the open interval (0, 1). It will be recalled 
that when the Lorenz curve shifts upward it becomes closer to the diagonal which gives the state of 
complete equality.  
(10) For the contributions to this literature see, for example, Perotti (1996) and Aghion and Howitt 
(1998) and references cited therein. Perotti (1996: 151-154) classifies this literature into four groups: 
"endogenous fiscal policy"; "sociopolitical stability"; "borrowing constraints and investment in 
education"; and, "joint education-fertility decision". 
 (11) Without getting involved in technical details causal relationships can be estimated by running a 
regression of the form: G(y) = α + βZ + γ INEQ; where in this case we have the growth rate of per 
capita income as the dependent variable, Z is a vector of explanatory variables and INEQ is an 
inequality variable. 
(12) Deininger and Olinto (2000). 
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(13) It will be recalled that the title of one of the most influential papers on the subject carried the term 
“social contract” thus: “Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract” (Benabou 
(2000). The paper, however, deals with advanced countries: USA and Western Europe.     
 
(14) According to Elbadawi (2005: 296, table1) the Arab world recorded an average per capita growth 
rate of 2.5 percent per annum over the period 1960-1984 with a standard deviation of 2.2 percentage 
points reflecting a relatively high level of volatility. The annual growth rates of the various groups was 
as follows: diversified economies 3.1 percent; mixed oil producers 1.9 percent; oil economies 5.5 
percent; and primary export economies 0.4 percent.  
(15) See Elbadawi and Makdisi (2007) who, using a widely recognized classification of political regimes 
that ranges from democratic to dictatorship, found that most of the Arab countries could be classified as 
authoritarian regimes over the period 1950-1990, and that these regimes tended to survive much longer 
than the median regime of their type in the world.  
(16) The HDI is calculated for 177 country and region: Iceland with an HDI of 0.969 was the best 
performing country while Sierra Leone, with an HDI of 0.336 was the worst performer.  
(17) For the philosophical issues of inequality, looked at from a development perspective, see Sen (1999 
and 1992). For various measures of inequality see, among others, Sen and Foster (1997) and Duclos 
and Araar (2006).  
(18) It will be recalled that the Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality based on the Lorenz curve 
which gives a non-linear relationship between the cumulative share of population and the 
corresponding cumulative share of consumption expenditure or income, where individuals are arrayed 
from the poorest to the richest. The Gini coefficient ranges from unity for the case of complete 
inequality (i.e. only one individual getting 100 percent of expenditure) to zero for the case of complete 
equality (i.e. every individual getting average expenditure).  
(19) Nine Arab countries are included in this compilation: Algeria (with a survey for 1995); Egypt 
(1995); Jordan (1992 and 2002); Kuwait (1998); Lebanon (1995); Mauritania (1993); Morocco (1998); 
Tunisia (1995); and Yemen (1992). In addition, we also include the Gini for Syria for 2003, (from El-
Laithy and Abu-Ismail (2006)).  
(20) For the 1990s decade the average Gini at the level of the world was 0.4076 with a standard 
deviation of 0.1031. The lowest degree of inequality of 0.129 was recorded for the Slovak Republic 
(for 1992), while the highest degree of inequality of 0.677 was recorded for Namibia (for 1993). 
(21) See El-Issawy (2007: 535, table 8.6). 
(22) Ferreira and Ravallion (2008). 
(23) UNDP (2005) 
(24) This is what Milanovic (2005: 7-8) calls "concept 3" inequality where inequality is calculated across 
all individuals in the (Arab) world. Inequality under concepts 1 and 2 take countries as units of analysis 
un-weighted and weighted by population respectively. Concept 3 inequality is talked about as the true 
inequality. 
(25) Using the software POVCAL of the World Bank (see the poverty net site in www.worldbank.org). 
(26) The pooled results also show that the Arab Lorenz curve has shifted downwards between the two 
years. Thus, for example, the share of the lowest quintile was 6.6% of total consumption expenditure in 
1995, but declined to 5.5% in 2004. Correspondingly, the share of the richest quintile increased from 
43% in 1995 to 44.6% in 2004. 
(27) The idea of the tunnel effect has recently been invoked by Ravallion and Lokshin (2000), Birdsall, 
Graham and Pettinato (2000), and the Commission on Growth (2008). 
(28) This is an echo of Kuznets' (1955) hypothesis that during the early stages of development inequality 
is expected to rise as per capita GDP increases and then falls. The inequality-development relationship 
is a long-run one that  traces the structural transformation  in dual economies ala Lewis (1954), but the 
evidence used was from advanced countries.     
(29) For the problems involved in the definition of a civil war, and the coding of conflicts accordingly, 
see Sambanis (2005: 303-305). 
(30) See also Collier, Hoeffler and Sambanis (2005). 
(31) Without attempting to draw conclusions we report in annex table (A.3) ethnic, language and 
religious fractionalization indexes from Alesina et al (2003). On the basis of these we also calculated a 
social fractionalization index as the product of the three indexes. It is an easy matter to show that the 
Arab sub-sample enjoys a lower social fractionalization (mean index of 0.0417 with a standard 
deviation of 0.0713) compared to the non-Arab sub-sample (mean index of 0.1712 with a standard 
deviation of 0.1815). The t-value for the difference between means is 2.0983 significant at the 5-
percent level. 
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(32) It is interesting to note that Collier,  Hoeffler, and Sambanis (2005) list only seven Arab countries 
with a civil war of more than year duration: Algeria; Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen 
Arab Republic.      
(33) A similar result is obtained if we are to use the shorter list of civil wars in Collier, Hoeffler and 
Sambanis (2005). In this compilation only six countries are included: Algeria (with a civil war 1975); 
Iraq (1961); Lebanon (1975); Morocco (1975); Somalia (1982); Sudan (1963); and Arab Republic of 
Yemen (1962).  
(34) It is interesting to note that the Arab sub-sample was significantly different from the non-Arab sub-
sample as far as religious (respective means of 0.2262 and 0.4215), and language (respective means of 
0.3048 and 0.5690), fractionalization: with respective  t-values of 2.4 and 2.6, meaning more 
homogeneity among Arab countries;  but not with respect to ethnic fractionalization (t-value of 0.17) 
(annex table A.3 provides the information on which the above results are based)! 
(35) Earlier indications that the Arab countries, in historical perspective, may be subject to a shallow 
tunnel effect due to ethnic fractionalization is to be found in Al-Ansari (1995).  
(36) Examples of interaction of the social and economic inequalities can be found in the case of women 
in patriarchal societies; those of the interaction of political and economic inequalities involve farmers 
working for powerful landlords, as well as poor individuals in geographically isolated regions and 
ethnic minorities.   
(37) The appropriate definition of a stable macroeconomic policy environment would take into account 
the results of Easterly (2003) which show that unless a country is starting from extremely poor policy 
indicators it should not expect to see improvements in its growth rates as a result of improving its 
policy stance in the direction of the old style structural adjustment policies. But also see the recent 
recommendations of the Commission on Growth and Development (2008: 33-69). 
(38) In this respect it is perhaps significant to note that the World Bank (2006: 247-273) does 
not refer to these results in its massive reference list! 
(39) Other explanatory variables included the average years of schooling attained by population 25 years 
and above (i.e. education); the number of physicians per thousand people (i.e. health); the ratio of 
credit to the private sector to GDP (i.e. financial depth); the CPI inflation rate (i.e. macroeconomic 
instability); and, the share of industry and services in total values added (i.e. economic structure). 
(40) Note that these weights are obtained from principal component analysis. 
(41) The conclusion is based on the estimated coefficients of the stock and quality indicators of 0.0464 
(significant at the 10 percent level), and 0.0102 (significant at the 5 percent level) respectively (see 
table 6 column 5 in Calderon and Serven (2004: 37)). 
(42) According to World Bank (2001: 306-307, table 17) information middle, lower middle, upper 
middle, and high income groups saw their ratios increasing respectively from 23% to 40%; 18% to 
26%; 32% to 48%; and, 56% to 60%. For the world as a whole the ratio increased from 23% to 37%. 
The evidence for 2005 is from WDI 2007.   
(43) The background paper on which the figure is based, which is to be found on the World Bank web-
site, does not have its statistical appendix; nor is the data set lodged in the data sets web-site!!!! 
 
(44) The time series on unemployment in the Arab countries is compiled by Belkacem Laabas of the 
Arab Planning Institute in Kuwait. A recent compilation for Syria is taken from the State Planning 
Commission of Syria. 
(45) In 2005 the total labor force of these countries amounted to 67.5 million representing about 57% of 
the total Arab labor force (LAS et al (2007)). 
(46) The time trend coefficient for Algeria is 0.0279 (with a t-value of 7.2 and an R-squared of 0.69), 
that for Egypt is 0.0223 (with a t-value of 3.9 and an R-squared of 0.4), that for Jordan is 0.0655 (with 
a t-value of 6.2 and an R-squared of 0.63), that for Morocco is 0.0082 (with a t-value of 1.4 and an R-
Squared of 0.08), that for Syria is 0.024 (with a t-value of 6.2; and an R-squared of 0.52), and that for 
Tunisia is 0.0082 (with a t-value of 6.3 and an R-Squared of 0.65). 
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1988  6.54  10.79 14.82 20.67 47.18  2136  39.9  Algeria 
(WIDER)  1995  6.97  11.55 16.23 22.63 42.62  1835  35.4 
1995  9.80  13.20 16.60 21.40 39.00  2156  28.7  Egypt (World 
Bank (2007))  2004  8.90  12.69 16.03 20.79 41.55  2543  34.4 
1997  7.00  11.19 15.12 21.10 45.58  2159  37.9  Jordan (World 
Bank (2004))  2003  6.92  11.13 15.25 21.53 45.16  2419  37.6 
1997  7.91  12.12 16.05 22.85 42.07  1984  33.7  Syria (El-Laithy 
and Abu Ismail 
(2005))  2004  7.21  10.21 14.30 21.18 47.12  1948  39.2 
1995  6.19  10.78 15.49 21.95 45.59  1030  38.9  Mauritania 
(WIDER)  2000  6.20  10.60 15.20 22.30 45.70  981  39.0 
1991  6.50  10.60 14.80 21.30 46.60  1622  39.2  Morocco 
(World  Bank 
(2001))  1999  4.00  9.00  15.00 22.50 49.50  1542  39.4 
1990  6.00  10.50 15.30 22.20 46.10  2142  40.1  Tunisia (World 
Bank (2003))  2000  6.00  10.30 14.80 21.70 47.20  2788  40.8 
1998  7.34  12.02 16.29 22.31 42.04  730  34.4  Yemen (World 
Bank (2002); 
and WIDER)  2005  7.16  11.37 15.30 20.83 45.36  810  37.7 





Annex Table (A.2): Inequality in the Arab World: Quintile Share in Consumption Expenditure 
(percentages) 
 


















1995 6.4  11.6  16.4  22.5  43.0  36.23  1897 





























Afghanistan  1945 1978 33  0.7693  0.6141  0.2717  0.1284 
Algeria  1962 1992 30  0.3394  0.4427  0.0091  0.0014 
Angola  1975 1975  0  0.7139  0.6848  0.2326  0.1137 
Argentina  1945 1975 30  0.2550  0.0618  0.2236  0.0035 
Bangladesh  1971 1974  3  0.0454  0.0925  0.2090  0.0009 
Burundi  1962 1965  3  0.2951  0.2977  0.5158  0.0345 
Cambodia  1953 1970 17  0.2105  0.2104  0.0965  0.0453 
Chad  1960 1965  5  0.8620  0.8635  0.6411  0.0043 
China  1945 1946  1  0.1538  0.1327  0.6643  0.0136 
Columbia  1945 1948  3  0.6014  0.0193  0.1478  0.0017 
Congo  1960 1993 33  0.8747  0.6871  0.6642  0.3392 
DR Congo  1960 1960  0  0.8747  0.8705  0.7021  0.5346 
Djibouti  1977 1991 14  0.7962  0.6558  0.0435  0.0227 
Egypt  1945 1995 50  0.1836  0.0237  0.1979  0.0008 
El Salvador  1945 1979 34  0.1978  -  0.3559  -- 
Ethiopia  1945 1974 29  0.7235  0.8073  0.6249  0.3650 
Guatemala  1945 1966 21  0.5122  0.4586  0.3753  0.0882 
Guinea B.   1974 1998 24  0.8082  0.8141  0.6128  0.4032 
Haiti  1945 1991 46  0.0950  --  0.4704  -- 
India  1946 1946  0  0.4182  0.8069  0.3260  0.1100 
Indonesia  1949 1950  1  0.7351  0.7680  0.2340  0.1321 
Iran  1945 1978 33  0.6684  0.7462  0.1152  0.0575 
Iraq  1945 1961 16  0.3689  0.3694  0.4844  0.0660 
Jordan  1945 1970 25  0.5926  0.0396  0.0659  0.0015 
Kenya  1963 1963  0  0.8588  0.8860  0.7765  0.5908 
South Korea  1949 1948  0  0.0020  0.0021  0.6604  0.0000 
Laos  1954 1960  6  0.5139  0.6382  0.5453  0.1788 
Lebanon  1946 1975 29  0.1314  0.1312  0.7886  0.0136 
Liberia  1945 1989 44  0.9084  0.9038  0.4883  0.4009 
Mali  1960 1990 30  0.6906  0.8388  0.1820  0.1054 
Morocco  1956 1975 19  0.4841  0.4683  0.0035  0.0008 
Mozambique  1975 1976  1  0.6932  0.8125  0.6759  0.3807 
Myanmar  1948 1948  0  0.5062  0.5072  0.1974  0.0507 
Namibia  1973 1973  0  0.6329  0.7005  0.6626  0.2938 
Nicaragua  1945 1978 33  0.4844  0.0473  0.4290  0.0098 
Nigeria  1960 1967  7  0.8505  0.8503  0.7421  0.5367 
Pakistan  1947 1973 24  0.7098  0.7190  0.3848  0.1964 
Papua NG  1975 1988 13  0.2718  0.3526  0.5523  0.0529 
Peru  1945 1980 35  0.6566  0.3358  0.1988  0.0438 
Philippines  1946 1950  4  0.2385  0.8360  0.3056  0.0609 
Rwanda  1962 1963  1  0.3238  --  0.5066  -- 
Senegal  1960 1989 29  0.6939  0.6961  0.1497  0.0723 
S. Leone  1961 1991 30  0.8191  0.7634  0.5395  0.3373 
Somalia  1960 1988 28  0.8117  0.0326  0.0028  0.0001 
Sri Lanka  1948 1983 35  0.4150  0.4645  0.4853  0.0936 
Sudan  1956 1963  7  0.7147  0.7190  0.4307  0.2213 
Syria  1946 1979 33  0.5399  0.1817  0.4310  0.0423 
Thailand  1945 1966 21  0.6338  0.6344  0.0994  0.0400 
Turkey  1945 1984 39  0.3200  0.2216  0.0049  0.0003 
Uganda  1962 1966  4  0.9302  0.9227  0.6332  0.5435 
Vietnam  1955 1960  5  0.2383  0.2377  0.5080  0.0288 
A.R. Yemen  1945 1962 17  --  0.0080  0.0023  -- 
Zimbabwe  1966 1972  6  0.3874  0.4472  0.7363  0.1276 
Source: own compilation for civil wars of duration more than one year from Sambanis (2008). Fractionalization indexes are 
from Alesina et al (2003). The fractionalization index  for any category is (for i=1…n; and where S is the share of the i
th 
group)  FI = 1 - ∑ Si
2 .
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